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Abstract
This paper responds to the defences of "culture" and "development" rights
as justifications for exceptionalism in human rights obligations in Southeast
Asia, particularly against the context of the passage of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Charter. Under the new ASEAN
Charter, Member States have the general obligation to abide by the
Organizational Principles of "adherence to the rule of law, good
governance, the principles of democracy and constitutional government", as
well as "respect for fundamental freedoms, the promotion and protection of
human rights, and the promotion of social justice". More importantly, it is
now the specific obligation of ASEAN Member States to "take all necessary
measures, including the enactment of appropriate domestic legislation, to
effectively implement the provisions of the Charter and to comply with all
obligations of membership", including the above-stated Organizational
Principles.
The paper shows the normative, conceptual, and empirical weaknesses of
the "culture" and "development" justifications for creating exceptions to the
observance and protection of core human rights norms. Assessing the right
to culture as an exception to human rights observance, the paper asserts the
ideological imprecision of the "right to culture" as an exception to human
rights observance, noting that the porous definition of "culture" should not
be equally valued in its assertion against core human rights norms which
form part of general international law (e.g. jus cogens prohibitions, crimes
against humanity, war crimes, egregious violations of human rights,
obligations erga omnes) and which can be modified only by a subsequent
norm of the same character. The cultural exception also suffers from
teleological incoherence, since the protection of core human rights norms
bears a greater immediacy and proximity to human dignity and personhood
- a fundamental value that should be more conceptually valuable than the
porous construct of culture. Turning to the "right to development" as an
exception to human rights observance, the paper contends that there is
empirical uncertainty and/or indeterminacy in the concept of "development"
that undermines its legal-philosophical value as an exception to human
rights observance. Moreover, contrary to the assertions of development
exceptionalism to human rights observance, there is no linearity in the claim
that human rights protection "impedes" development. Rather, as shown in
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recent economic analysis, there is a stronger claim for human rights
protection as a necessary precondition for development.
Further reinforcing these refutations of "culture" and "development"
justifications for human rights exceptionalism is, however, the emergence of
a customary international law norm rejecting impunity for serious violations
of human rights (specifically, civil and political rights), which has gained
recognition from the forty-year independent practice (primarily seen in
treaty ratifications and implementation) of Southeast Asian states. Despite
variances in the degree of ASEAN Member States' practices, there is at
least consistent opinio juris that redress for serious human rights violations
should not be met with non liquet in remedial processes, whether domestic
or international. The passage of the ASEAN Charter therefore marks a
convergence of ASEAN towards "universalizing" core human rights norms
as now seen in its Organizational Principles and the new requirements of
ASEAN membership obligations.
A. Introduction
The conclusion of a Charter for the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN),' formalizing greater economic integration 2 forty years
after ASEAN's inception under the 1967 ASEAN (Bangkok) Declaration, 3
is indeed a landmark achievement for the Southeast Asian region. In the
Full text of the ASEAN Charter can be found at: http://www.asean.org (last visited
1 December 2008). This paper is based on a public Lecture and Roundtable
Discussion on the Draft ASEAN Charter held on 31 August 2007, at the University of
the Philippines, with corresponding modifications based on the final Charter text. As
of this writing, seven out of the ten ASEAN Member States have ratified the Charter:
Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, Singapore, Laos, Viet Nam, Cambodia, and most
recently, Myanmar. Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia publicly declared that
they were withholding ratification of the Charter until Myanmar completed its
ratification processes. See: Christopher Bodeen, "Myanmar Ratifies ASEAN Charter:
Isolated Myanmar Regime Ratifies Regional Charter Including Human Rights Body,"
Associated Press, 21 July 2008, at http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?
id-5414011 (last visited 23 January 2009).
2 See: Ong Keng Yong, Secretary-General of the ASEAN, "ASEAN and Pan-Asian
Integration". Found at: http://www.aseansec.org/18861.htm (last visited
23 January 2009).
See Declaration of ASEAN Concord, Bali, Indonesia, 24 February 1976. Found at:
http://www.aseansec.org/1216.htm (last visited 23 January 2009).
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words of the ASEAN Secretary-General, Mr. Ong Keng Yong, the new
ASEAN closely tracks ASEAN's record of increasing economic integration,
but would still be well short of the economic union envisaged under the
European Union:
"ASEAN economic integration is currently in progress, but the
results are not as fast as what the ASEAN Leaders and the
business sector wants. The problems of implementation and
coordination of ASEAN economic initiatives requires urgent
attention. Deeper and accelerated economic integration entails
deeper and broader cross-sectoral coordination as well as
expeditious implementation of economic integration initiatives.
I...I
Although the end goals of the ASEAN Economic Community
have been defined in ASEAN Vision 2020 and Bali Concord II,
it is crucial to underscore that ASEAN is not constructing an
economic community along the lines of the European Union
(EU). While EU ensures the free movement of goods, services,
capital (including investment) and people across the territories
of its Member States, ASEAN seeks to create a unique single
ASEAN market where there is a free flow of goods, services,
investment, skilled labour, and a freer flow of capital.
While ASEAN pursues economic integration, it is also
committed to making the region attractive to its partners for
economic activities. Indeed, ASEAN integration will open up
more opportunities for these partners. At the same time, it will
further strengthen ASEAN's external trade with them. The
commitment to open regionalism and inclusive approach to its
external economic engagement has made ASEAN attractive to
many countries, both in the region and beyond. ASEAN is
currently at different stages of FTA and EPA negotiations with
its partners namely, China, India, Japan, Republic of Korea and
Australia/New Zealand."
The passage of the ASEAN Charter carves new directions for,
and bears serious implications to, the political-economic rights
and duties of ASEAN Member States. For an international
organization long accustomed to abiding by the rule of
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"consensus," 4 the sovereign equality of states, and non-
5interference with "internal" or domestic matters, a more
"integrated" ASEAN implies a marked retooling of ASEAN's
unique status as an international organization. More importantly,
the passage of the ASEAN Charter and the creation of a "new"
ASEAN, opportunely provoke analytical discourse on ASEAN
Member States' commitments to uphold international human
rights obligations.
6
These developments in the Southeast Asian region lend urgency to the
reassessment of a debate long dormant since the last decade. Should the
envisioned "new" ASEAN - refashioned towards tighter integration and
oriented towards global participation - "universalize" core human rights
now, and veer away from the exceptionalism of cultural relativist and
developmental justifications of "Asian culture and values" and "Asian
development"?
The controversy between the "universality" of human rights (as well
as their enforcement) and claims to "exceptions" in the form of the
competing "right to culture" and the "right to development" first drew a
worldwide audience in 1993, when several Asian delegations at the Vienna
World Conference on Human Rights declared that human rights have to be
seen "in the context of particular cultures."7 However, the final text of the
Vienna Declaration and Program of Action, which was approved by a
consensus of the representatives of the 171 participating States (including
the Asian delegates), ultimately affirmed the universality of human rights.
4 The conventional basis for ASEAN is found in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
in Southeast Asia, Indonesia, 24 February 1976. Found at: http://www.aseansec.org/
1217.htm (last visited 23 January 2009). The twenty (20) provisions of the TAC map
out the parameters of ASEAN cooperation since 1976.
5 See Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II), Bali, Indonesia,
7 October 2003, which emphasizes the principles of sovereign equality of states and
non-interference as a key principle governing the ASEAN Community, composed of
the ASEAN Security Community, ASEAN Economic Community, and ASEAN
Socio-Cultural Community." Found at: http://www.aseansec.org/15159.htm (last
visited 23 January 2009).
6 See Amando Doronila, "Out of Step with ASEAN", Philippine Daily Inquirer,
3 August 2007. Found at: http://www.inquirer.net/specialreports/40amm/view.php?db
-l&article-20070803-80298 (last visited 23 January 2009), which criticizes that
during the 4 0th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting hosted by the Philippines, ASEAN
Member States merely agreed by consensus to establish, "in principle", a human rights
commission - without providing for its composition, functions, or sanctions.
Louis Henkin, Human Rights (1999), 107.
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The one hundred-article Vienna Declaration categorically dispensed with
the asserted "exceptions" of culture and development, stating in no
uncertain terms that:
"5. All human rights are universal, indivisible and
interdependent and interrelated. The international community
must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on
the same footing, and with the same emphasis. While the
significance of national and regional particularities and various
historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in
mind, it is the duty of States, regardless of their political,
economic and cultural systems, to promote and protect all
human rights and fundamental freedoms.
I...I
10. The World Conference on Human Rights reaffirms the right
to development, as established in the Declaration on the Right to
Development, as a universal and inalienable right and an
integral part of fundamental human rights.
As stated in the Declaration on the Right to Development, the
human person is the central subject of development.
While development facilitates the enjoyment of all human
rights, the lack of development may not be invoked to justify
the abridgement of internationally recognized human
rights."8 (Emphasis supplied)
This paper does not intend to resurrect old themes and tensions
already extensively treated in the wealth of literature on universalist-cultural
relativist/development theories on human rights. 9 Rather, the intention is to
recast these twin justifications of "culture" and "development" in light of
8 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, Distr. GENERAL A./CONF.157/23,
12 July 1993. Found at: http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/
A.CONF. 157.23.En?OpenDocument (last visited 23 January 2009).
For a broad spectrum of universalist and cultural relativist claims, see Jack Donnelly,
Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, 2 "nd ed. (2003), 89-106; Randall P.
Peerenboom (ed.), Asian Discourses of Rule of Law: Theories and Implementation of
Rule of Law in Twelve Asian countries, France, and the U.S. (2004), Preface (x-xxiii),
and 1-55; Li Xiarong, Asian Values and the Universality of Human Rights,
Philosophy and Public Policy Quarterly, 16 (1996) 2, 18-23.
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ASEAN's new status as a more integrated international organization
alongside its corresponding obligations in the enforcement and protection of
human rights. The fundamental argument here is that, apart from the
inherent normative, conceptual, and empirical weaknesses of the "culture"
and "development" justifications, ASEAN's internal and external spheres of
international human rights obligations have altered radically since
ASEAN's inception forty years ago. A potent customary international law
norm rejecting impunity for serious violations of "core" human rights
(specifically, civil and political rights) has emerged, one that even most
ASEAN Member States themselves acknowledge as express obligations
under the major human rights treaties (especially the International Bill of
Rights), most of which ASEAN Member States have already ratified.
Accordingly, the challenge for the new ASEAN is to ascertain if it can
"universalize" these core human rights (by way of recognition, codification,
heightened multilateral enforcement, or any combination of these processes
throughout the ASEAN regional framework), and ultimately dispense with
cultural and developmental "exceptions" used to justify individual nations'
selective (or non)enforcement of human rights norms. In this manner, the
individual human rights compliance of ASEAN Member States can be
monitored and modulated through the prism of specific ASEAN
membership obligations mandating compliance with international human
rights norms. The ASEAN Charter is the litmus test for the capacity of
ASEAN Member States to adapt to their new roles under an international
organization subject to international human rights law.
I submit that ASEAN's new status as a more integrated international
organization foregrounds ASEAN's acceptance of the customary
international law norms on "core" human rights (international civil and
political rights). The acceptance of these core human rights norms is not an
alien concept to the region, particularly in light of ASEAN's record over the
past forty years. As will be subsequently shown, most, if not all, of the
ASEAN Member States themselves already recognize these norms,
expressly (by signature, treaty ratification, accession) or in individual or
collective practice. This "internal sphere" of ASEAN, therefore, already
reflects ASEAN Member States' opinio juris on the obligation to comply
and observe international human rights law, and a concomitant obligation of
states to reject impunity for core human rights violations (and/orjus cogens
violations) such as torture, crimes against humanity, war crimes, apartheid,
racial and sexual discrimination, and serious violations of child and
women's rights. For "impunity," I adopt the threshold of de jure or de facto
impossibility in bringing human rights violators to account - whether civilly,
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criminally, or administratively - either under: 1) the ASEAN Member
States' own legal orders through a comparable Bill of Rights set forth in
their respective Constitutions; 2) through the international processes and
mechanisms available or accessible from the major human rights treaties
some, any or all of which have been ratified by ASEAN Member States
(e.g. ICCPR's Human Rights Committee, the ICESCR's Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the CERD's Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination, CEDAW's Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination against Women, the CAT's Committee
Against Torture, CRC's Committee on the Rights of the Child).; or 3)
through emergent joint initiatives for prosecution coordinated or facilitated
between ASEAN, the member State, and the United Nations (e.g. most
recently seen in the Cambodia War Crimes Tribunal and the Commission
for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor). Undoubtedly, these
mechanisms are not without their attendant limitations, particularly in the
scope and types of relief afforded. Nevertheless, these limitations do not
militate against the proposition that the rejection of impunity reflects the
ASEAN Member States' deliberate refusal to condone a situation of non
liquet in remedial processes for obtaining redress against human rights
violations.
10
On the other hand, ASEAN forty years from inception finds itself in
an international sphere that more strictly emphasizes the United Nations
Charter's purpose of "promoting and encouraging respect for human rights
and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language, or religion".'' With the proliferation of international criminal
prosecutions for war crimes, torture, crimes against humanity, and other
serious breaches of "core" human rights norms on civil and political rights
and codification of various international instruments outlawing these
breaches, an international consensus has largely emerged towards the
rejection of impunity for these serious human rights violations. ASEAN's
"external sphere" itself descriptively expands the scope of ASEAN and its
10 Jorge E. Viifuales, Impunity: Elements for an Empirical Concept, Law & Inequallity
25 (2007) 1, 115-145, 117-119; see also Milena Sterio, Seeking the Best Forum to
Prosecute International War Crimes: Proposed Paradigms and Solutions, Florida
Journal of International Law 18 (2006) 3, 887-906, 889; M. Cherif Bassiouni,
International Recognition of Victims' Rights, Human Rights Law Review 6 (2006) 2,
203-279, 218-223.
l Charter of the United Nations, Chapter I, Article 1(3), full text in Ian Brownlie, Basic
Documents in International Law, 5 th ed. (2002), 2-26.
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Member States' international legal obligations towards human rights
protection.
The "push-and-pull" effect, 12 therefore, of ASEAN's "internal" and
"external" spheres reinforces an equilibrium-imperative upon ASEAN to
reject impunity by "universalizing" core human rights norms. Under this
equilibrium-imperative, the new ASEAN should be expected to rely less (or
not at all) on the twin exceptions of "culture" and "development" to the
universality of human rights.
Part I of this paper examines ASEAN as an international organization
under its current framework, and synthesizes distinct innovations under the
ASEAN Charter, specifically in aspects of recognition, enforcement, and/or
protection of human rights in the Southeast Asian region. Parts II and III
then respectively scrutinize the twin justifications of "culture" and
"development" from an interdisciplinary orientation, showing the inherent
philosophical-conceptual and empirical weaknesses of these justifications as
normative standards or "exceptions" to "core" human rights norms. Part IV
describes the respective "internal" and "external" spheres in which the new
ASEAN will operate as an international organization. The present "internal"
sphere of ASEAN is depicted in light of ASEAN Member States' recent
express and implied recognition of "core" human rights norms (jus cogens
norms and/or first generation civil and political rights) alongside ASEAN's
wider international human rights obligations due to its retooled nature as an
international organization subject to international human rights law.
Thereafter, I depict ASEAN's "external" sphere considering the emergence
of customary international law rejecting impunity for violations of "core"
human rights violations. Despite variances in degree, ASEAN Member
States' separate practices of recognition and/or enforcement of these core
human rights norms - combined with the acceptance of broader human
rights obligations and firmer commitments to democracy under the new
rule-based ASEAN - should be seen an inevitable path towards, or mode of
universalism in normative rights discourse and institutional protection.
The conclusion drawn is deliberate. Considering ASEAN's "internal"
and "external" spheres, the new ASEAN cannot afford to maintain its
previous position of virtual silence on international obligations concerning
the recognition and enforcement of "first generation"' 3 rights such as civil
12 The heuristic is analogized from the interplay of Keynesian economic concepts of
"cost-push inflation" and "demand-pull inflation". For an illustration of the interplay
of these two forces, see also Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Roaring Nineties (2003), 3-28.
13 For a thorough synthesis of the provenance and distinctions between "first generation"
rights (civil and political rights such as those codified under the International
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and political rights. While mutual respect for diversity remains a keystone in
the realpolitik between ASEAN members, the recognition and enforcement
of these core human rights need not be seen as a radical departure from
ASEAN's consensus-building orientation. The universalization of core
human rights in ASEAN is not incompatible with the duties of ASEAN
Member States as parties to the ASEAN, the Charter of the United Nations,
and as active members in the community of nations. Universalism in this
case, therefore, might even be seen as a phenomenon long overdue.
B. ASEAN's Legal Personality as an International
Organization Subject to International Law
From an initial membership of five Southeast Asian states (Indonesia,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) in 1967, ASEAN has
expanded its current membership to ten 10, including Brunei Darussalam,
Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia. The primary constitutive legal
instruments of ASEAN are the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
(TAC) in Southeast Asia 14 and the 1967 ASEAN (Bangkok) Declaration.' 5
Under the terms of the TAC and the Bangkok Declaration, ASEAN, prior to
its new Charter, was simply an "association for regional cooperation."
1 6
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights), "second generation" rights (economic and
social rights such as in the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights), and "third generation" rights (post-war "collective" rights such as the right to
environmentally sustainable economic development, peace, security, etc.), see Eric A.
Engle, Universal Human Rights: A Generational History, Annual Survey of
International & Comparative Law 12 (2006), 219-268, 254-266.
14 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, Indonesia, 24 February 1976
(supra note 5).
15 ASEAN Declaration, 8 August 1976, Bangkok, Thailand. Full text found at:
http://www.aseansec.org/1212.htm (last visited 23 January 2009).
16 Id.: "I. To accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural development
in the region through joint endeavours in the spirit of equality and partnership in order
to strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community of South-East
Asian Nations; 2. To promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for
justice and the rule of law in the relationship among countries of the region and
adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter; 3. To promote active
collaboration and mutual assistance on matters of common interest in the economic,
social, cultural, technical, scientific and administrative fields; 4. To provide assistance
to each other in the form of training and research facilities in the educational,
professional, technical and administrative spheres; 5.To collaborate more effectively
for the greater utilization of their agriculture and industries, the expansion of their
trade, including the study of the problems of international commodity trade, the
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In furtherance of the cooperative aims previously mentioned, the TAC
strictly enjoins ASEAN Member States to observe the fundamental
principles of mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality,
territorial integrity, and national identity of the respective Member States;
freedom from external interference, subversion or coercion; renunciation of
the threat or use of force; and peaceful settlement of disputes.17 At the time
of its creation, ASEAN's international legal personality was "relative" or
"subjective",18 being attributable to the express recognition of its Member
States under the framework of the TAC and the Bangkok Declaration.
In 1994, ASEAN established the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF),
which facilitates cooperation on political and security matters through
confidence building, "preventive diplomacy," and constructive dialogue
with ASEAN political partners. 19 (Participants to the ARF include Australia,
Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Canada, China, the European Union, India,
Indonesia, Japan, the Democratic Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea
(ROK), the Lao PDR, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, New Zealand,
Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, the Russian Federation,
Singapore, Thailand, the United States, and Viet Nam.) Issues foremost on
the ARF's agenda are nuclear non-proliferation, 20  counter-terrorism,
territorial disputes,21 and transnational crime. 22
improvement of their transportation and communications facilities and the raising of
the living standards of their peoples; 6. To promote South-East Asian studies; 7. To
maintain close and beneficial cooperation with existing international and regional
organizations with similar aims and purposes, and explore all avenues for even closer
cooperation among themselves."
17 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, Indonesia, 24 February 1976
(supra note 4).
18 Oriol Casanovas, Unity and Pluralism in Public International Law (2001), 124-125.
19 See ARF overview at http://www.aseanregionalforum.org/AboutUs/tabid/57/Default.
aspx (last visited 23 January 2009).
20 See Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality Declaration, Kuala Lumpur,
27 November 1971. Full text at: http://www.aseansec.org/1215.htm (last visited
23 January2009); Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone,
Bangkok, Thailand, 15December 1995. Full text at: http://www.aseansec.org/
2082.htm (last visited 23 January 2009).
21 See Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, Phnom Penh,
Cambodia, 4November2002 at: http://www.aseansec.org/13163.htm (last visited
09 January 2009).
22 See overview of ARF history and developments at http://www.aseansec.org/92.htm
(last visited 23 January 2007).
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Consistent with the "ASEAN Vision 2020," (which articulates
Member States' long-term objectives for ASEAN)23 regional cooperation is
facilitated through three "communities": the ASEAN Security Community,
the ASEAN Economic Community (which provides the venue for
24cooperation and dialogue in relation to the ASEAN Free Trade Area), and
the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community.
Pursuant to the fundamental principles of the TAC, decisions are
made by ASEAN Member States through the consensus of all its members.
ASEAN's "silences" and "omissions" in recognition and enforcement of
international human rights norms on civil and political rights have been
attributed to the difficulty of achieving a consensus, and ASEAN's strong
emphasis on the fundamental principles of sovereignty and non-
interference.25
The ASEAN Charter departs from ASEAN's present voluntary model
of international personality by expressly conferring upon ASEAN a "legal
personality" as an "intergovernmental organization," 26 and enjoying
functional immunities and privileges "necessary for the fulfilment of [the]
purposes" 27 of the organization. The hortatory provisions in the Preamble of
the ASEAN Charter widen ASEAN's orientation from political-economic
cooperation towards "adherence to the principles of democracy, the rule of
law and good governance, respect for and protection of human rights and
fundamental freedoms." 28 The contemplated new "purposes" of ASEAN
reflects this wider orientation:
23 Full text at: http://www.aseansec.org/1814.htm (last visited 23 January 2009).
24 See Hanoi Plan of Action, Hanoi, Vietnam, 15 December 1988. Full text at:
http://www.aseansec.org/687.htm (last visited 23 January 2009); Agreement on the
Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) Scheme for the ASEAN Free Trade
Area, Singapore, 28 January 1992. Full text at: http://www.aseansec.org/l 164.htm
(last visited 23 January 2009); Protocol to Amend the Framework Agreement on
Enhancing ASEAN Economic Cooperation, Thailand, 15 December 1995. Full text at:
http://www.aseansec.org/2083.htm (last visited 23 January 2009).
25 Li-ann Thio. Implementing Human Rights in ASEAN Countries: Promises to Keep
and Miles to Go Before I Sleep, Yale Human Rights & Development Law Journal,
2 (1999), 1-86, 6, 7, 49-57.26 ASEAN Charter, Chapter II (Legal Personality), Article 3.
27 ASEAN Charter, Chapter VI, Article 17. Chapter VI, Article 19(2) also provides that
"the conditions of immunities and privileges of the Permanent Representatives and
officials on ASEAN duties shall be governed by the 1961 Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations or in accordance with the national law of the ASEAN State
concerned".
28 Preamble to the ASEAN Charter, Seventh Clause.
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"1. To maintain and enhance peace, security and stability and
further strengthen peace-oriented values in the region;
2. To enhance regional resilience by promoting greater political,
security, economic, and socio-cultural cooperation;
3. To preserve Southeast Asia as a Nuclear Weapon-free Zone
and free of all other weapons of mass destruction;
4. To ensure that the peoples and Member States of ASEAN live
in peace with the world at large in a just, democratic, and
harmonious environment;
5. To create a single market and production base which is stable,
prosperous, highly competitive and economically integrated
with effective facilitation for trade and investment in which
there is a free flow of goods, services and investment; facilitated
movement of business, persons, professionals, talents and
labour; and freer flow of capital;
6. To alleviate poverty and narrow the development gap within
ASEAN through mutual assistance and cooperation;
7. To strengthen democracy, enhance good governance and the
rule of law, and to promote and protect human rights and
fundamental freedoms, with due regard to the rights and
responsibilities of the Member States of ASEAN;
8. To respond effectively, in accordance with the principle of
comprehensive security, to all forms of threats, transnational
crimes, and trans-boundary challenges; [...]" (Emphasis
supplied).
Thus, while the ASEAN Charter affirms the fundamental principles in
the TAC, the Bangkok Declaration and other treaties, declarations,
agreements, and international instruments annexed to the Charter, the
ASEAN Charter introduces a novel clause by making "respect for
fundamental freedoms, the promotion and protection of human rights, and
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the promotion of social justice", 29 and "adherence to the rule of law, good
governance, the principles of democracy and constitutional government"
30
key principles to govern the conduct of ASEAN and its Member States. In
relation to these broader purposes and principles of conduct, Member States
are expressly obligated to "take all necessary measures to effectively
comply with all obligations, including the enactment of appropriate
domestic legislation, to effectively implement the provisions of this Charter
and to comply with all obligations of membership."
31
Most importantly, the ASEAN Charter appears to dilute the consensus
requirement in decision-making. While the Charter categorically states that
"[a]s a basic principle, decision-making in ASEAN shall be based on
consultation and consensus," 32 the failure to achieve a consensus will vest
the ASEAN Summit with the authority to "decide how a specific decision
can be made." 33 Under the Charter, the ASEAN Summit (composed of the
Heads of State or Government of the ASEAN Member States) is the
"supreme policy-making body of ASEAN, 34 and is accordingly vested with
the following general powers to:
"b) deliberate, provide policy guidance and take decisions on
key issues pertaining to the realization of the objectives of
ASEAN, important matters of interest to Member States and all
issues referred to it by the ASEAN Coordinating Council, the
ASEAN Community Councils and ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial
Bodies;
c) instruct the relevant Ministers in each of the Councils
concerned to hold ad hoc inter-Ministerial meetings, and address
important issues concerning ASEAN that cut across the
Community Councils. Rules of procedure for such meetings
shall be adopted by the ASEAN Coordinating Council;
d) address emergency situations affecting ASEAN by taking
appropriate actions;
29 ASEAN Charter, Chapter I, Article 2 (Principles), Section 2(i).
30 ASEAN Charter, Chapter I, Article 2 (Principles), Section 2(h).
ASEAN Charter, Chapter III (Membership), Article 5(2).
32 ASEAN Charter, Chapter VII (Decision-Making), Article 20(1).
33 ASEAN Charter, Chapter VII, Article 20(2).
34 ASEAN Charter, Chapter IV (Organs), Article 7, Section 2(a).
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e) decide on matters referred to it under Chapter VII and VIII"
(Emphasis supplied).
The language of the ASEAN Charter also appears to vest the ASEAN
Summit with the authority to decide in cases where "[a]ny Member State
[is] affected by non-compliance with the findings, recommendations, or
decisions resulting from an ASEAN dispute settlement mechanism."
35
It would appear, therefore, that the new ASEAN contemplated in the
ASEAN Charter bears an "objective" legal personality, since the
organization's existence arises from the satisfaction of international legal
requirements for "organization": 1) the possession of the organization's own
"distinct will" apart from that of its members, evidenced by the
organization's power to take binding decisions upon the entire membership
through the vote of a mere majority of its members; 2) the presence of
organs bearing special tasks, defining the position of members in relation to
the Organization; and 3) the granting of legal capacity, privileges, and
immunities to the Organization in the territory of each of its Member
States.
36
ASEAN's acquisition of an objective legal personality under the
ASEAN Charter (in addition to its "relative" or "subjective" legal
personality conferred by its membership under the present framework of the
TAC and the Bangkok Declaration) has implications for its responsibility as
an international organization, and for the residuary responsibility of its
Member States, to third parties. If ASEAN under the ASEAN Charter were
to be viewed as a "distinct legal entity from its Member States," it would be
difficult to attribute responsibility per se to its Member States for acts
ascribed to or authored by ASEAN. However, if Member States' residuary
responsibility to third parties is to be affirmed even under the new ASEAN,
the process will likely take the shape of either: 1) "secondary Member
State responsibility", where the third party must first present its claim to
ASEAN, and recourse to the Member States would be had only if ASEAN
is in default in providing an adequate remedy; or 2) "indirect
responsibility", where Member States are deemed a priori responsible to
the organization to meet its obligations towards third parties. 37 As will be
discussed later in Part IV, ASEAN's revised international legal personality
3 ASEAN Charter, Chapter VIII (Settlement of Disputes), Article 27(2).
36 Jan Klabbers, An Introduction to International Institutional Law (2002), 54-57; see
also Reparation of Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory
Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1949, 178-179 and 185.
37 Klabbers, 311-3 12 (supra note 36).
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under the ASEAN Charter generates corresponding international legal
obligations and responsibilities of ASEAN and its Member States,
especially in the recognition, enforcement, and protection of core human
rights norms. Parts II and III will first respond to the issue of whether, in
themselves, the "right to culture" and "right to development" are still
satisfactory normative exceptions to advance the developing universalism of
core human rights norms in ASEAN.
C. Ideological and Teleological Weaknesses of the
"Right to Culture" as an Exception to
"Universalizing" Core Human Rights Norms
The "right to culture" has been invoked as a competing right that
qualifies, if not exempts, observance of core human rights norms on civil
and political rights (by extension, jus cogens prohibitions against torture,
slavery, crimes against humanity, war crimes, genocide, and egregious
human rights violations).38 The reference to culture is normatively
relativist,39 and presumptively argues that these "core" human rights norms
can be wholly "localized" in their interpretation and enforcement.
ASEAN has refrained from codifying core human rights norms (or the
first-generation civil and political rights) in its constitutive instruments, the
TAC and the Bangkok Declaration. Its declarations, treaties, and protocols
across its forty-year history have likewise denied any express codification of
these norms. Instead, ASEAN has focused much of its efforts towards
codification and enforcement of "second-generation" human rights norms
on economic and social rights throughout the region.
This lack of codification of "first generation" rights fuelled the "Asian
values" debate in the 1990s, led by some Southeast Asian heads of state
who decried "Western imperialism" through "Western imposition of rights"
deemed antithetical to "Asian values". The "cultural" exception was cast
along three premises - that rights are "culture specific;" that in Asia, "the
38 Richard A. Schweder, Customs Control: Some Anthropological Reflections on Human
Rights Crusades, Virginia Journal of Social Policy & the Law 14 (2006) 1, 1-38, 7-8,
11-13.
39 Randall Peerenboom, Beyond Universalism and Relativism: The Evolving Debates
About "Values in Asia", Indiana International & Comparative Law Review
14 (2003) 1, 1-86, 9-14.
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community takes precedence over individuals;" and that rights are
"subordinate to national sovereignty." 40
Considering the plethora of literature on the "Asian values" polemic,
the refutations to the foregoing premises have been multidimensional.
Philosophical approaches tend to argue in favour of the "transcendental"
nature of certain values enshrined in human rights, and that a cross-cultural
critique would yield the conclusion that these "values" are commonly found
across moral systems throughout the world.4' Cultural anthropological
approaches on the other hand point to the defects of transforming the
"descriptive" construct of culture (what a given culture's values supposedly
are) into a "prescriptive" call for localization of value judgments (or what
conduct a culture demands or prohibits).42 Historical approaches contend
that the provenance of human rights norms is not the post-World War II
"Western" intellectual thought and political architecture, but, in reality, are
the more ancient Asian civilizations which have been neglected and under-
researched in scholarly literature.43 These diverse approaches have spawned
their own quantitative and qualitative investigations and findings on the
nature and history of "Asian" cultures and their value systems.
The interdisciplinary approaches provoked some robust scholarly
debate on their claims to validity, and invited counter-refutations and
rejoinders - the tedium of which generated exasperation for some scholars
40 W. Theodore de Bary, Asian Values and Human Rights (1998), 6.
41 Paul H. Brietzke, Globalization, Nationalism, and Human Rights, Florida Journal of
International Law 17 (2005) 3, 633-691, 660-663, 671-675; William Joseph Wagner,
Universal Human Rights, the United Nations, and the Telos of Human Dignity, Ave
Maria Law Review 3 (2005) 1, 197-226, 205-214.
42 Elvin Hatch, Culture and Morality: The Relativity of Values in Anthropology (1983),
excerpt reproduced in: Henry Steiner & Philip Alston, International Human Rights in
Context: Law, Morals, Ethics, 2nd ed. (2000), 369; "[...] The relativists make the error
of deriving an 'ought' statement from an 'is' statement. To say that values vary from
culture to culture is to describe (accurately or not) an empirical state of affairs in the
real world, whereas the call for tolerance is a value judgment of what ought to be, and
it is logically impossible to derive the one from the other. The fact of moral diversity
no more compels our approval of other ways of life than the existence of cancer
compels us to value ill-health."
43 Surya P Subedi, Are the Principles of Human Rights 'Western' Ideas? An Analysis of
the Claim of the 'Asian' Concept of Human Rights from the Perspectives of
Hinduism, California Western International Law Journal 30 (1999) 1, 45-69, 48-57;
Raimundo Pannikar, Is the Notion of Human Rights A Western Concept?, excerpt
reproduced in Steiner & Alston, 383-389 (supra note 42).
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on the seeming futility of the universalism-cultural relativism debate.44 For
the purpose of ascertaining the viability of the "right to culture" exception
as a normative standard to be applied to the "new" ASEAN envisioned
under the ASEAN Charter, however, these interdisciplinary approaches,
while immensely valuable, appear unnecessarily inductive, rather than
deductive. The "right to culture" exception should be tested from the
standpoint of international law and the enforcement of "core" human rights
norms (civil and political rights under the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, as well as the jus cogens prohibitions on torture,
slavery, war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and other similarly
egregious human rights violations) which are deemed non-derogable.45
Taken against the primacy of these norms in the body of international law, it
is submitted that the inherent weakness of the "right to culture" as a
normative standard lies in its ideological imprecision and teleological
incoherence.
I. Ideological Imprecision
"Culture" is an amorphous and unwieldy construct of moving
parameters. It has been defined as referring to a set of normative principles,
values, practices and ideas unique to or identifiable with a group,46 which is
difficult to disaggregate, being a "series of processes that construct,
reconstruct, and dismantle cultural materials in response to identifiable
determinants".47 Paradoxically, while the "right to culture" is itself affirmed
as a fundamental human right,48 its very indeterminacy is the cause of its
disutility as a normative standard against core non-derogable human rights
norms.
44 See f. ex. Michel Rosenfeld, Can Human Rights Bridge the Gap Between
Universalism and Cultural Relativism? A Pluralist Assessment Based on the Rights of
Minorities", Columbia Human Rights Law Review 30 (1999), 249-284.
45 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory,
I.C.J. Reports (2004), paras. 105-109; Barcelona Traction Case, I.C.J. Reports (1966),
32, para. 33; Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion),
I.C.J. Reports (1996), para. 257.
46 FernandBraudel, A History of Civilisation (1995), 3-36.
47 Adam Kuper, Culture: The Anthropologists' Account (1999), excerpt reproduced in:
Steiner & Alston, 376-381 (supra note 42).
48 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Arts. 1(1), 15(1),
G.A. res. 2200A(XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16), at 49, UN Doc. A/6316
(1966), 993 U.N.T.S., entered into force 3 January 1976; Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, Article 27, UNGA A/Res 217, 10 December 1948.
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It is for this reason that critics of "cultural" exceptionalism to human
rights enforcement, particularly in Asia, refer to the obvious heterogeneity
of cultures and sub-cultures throughout the region, reducing "Asian" values
to straw arguments. 49 The diversity of Asian value systems and religio-
philosophical schools of intellectual thought ultimately makes it difficult to
carve a distinguishable normative exception.5 0 The porous nature of the
"right to culture" has been criticized as providing ostensibly "legal"
justifications for authoritarian regimes refusing to comply with international
human rights law.
However, defenders of "cultural" exceptionalism insist that there is no
disagreement with the "solid core" of international human rights law,
specifically the "core" and non-derogable human rights norms. A statement
attributed to a former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Singapore downplays
the existence of the controversy thus: "Diversity cannot justify gross
violations of human rights. Murder is murder whether perpetrated in
America, Asia or Africa. No one claims torture as part of their cultural
heritage," but that "the hard core of rights that is truly universal is perhaps
smaller than we sometimes like to pretend.,
51
The attempt to depict the "right to culture" as a "non-exception" to
core non-derogable human rights norms fails upon scrutiny of the historical
genesis of the prohibitive norms themselves. Violations of these norms,
before (or even after) their express codification, have been loosely justified
in the name of "culture." Slavery, for example, prior to being outlawed by
the international legal order, was treated for years as a cultural practice by
many states. "Honour" killings, which patently violate the fundamental
right to life, is justified under a "cultural" ethic that permits men to
vindicate their sense of filial or familial honour through the killing of
49 Amartya Sen, Human Rights and Asian Values, The New Republic, 33-40
(14 July 1997), excerpt reproduced in: Henkin, 113-115 (supra note 8); See especially
for the situation in China: Amy J McMaster, Human Rights at the Crossroads: When
East Meets West, Vermont Law Review 29 (2004) 2, 109-146, 134-145.
50 For the argument on the interpretive fit between an individual's cultural values and
conduct, see Chaim Perelman, Can the Rights of Man Be Founded?, in: Alan S.
Rosenbaum (ed.), The Philosophy of Human Rights: International Approaches (1980),
45-51.
51 Klabbers, 16 (supra note 36).
52 See Vernon Palmer, The Customs of Slavery: The War Without Arms, American
Journal of Legal History 48 (2006) 2, 177-218, 177-178.
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adulterous (or suspected unfaithful) wives and female family members.53
Genocide has been described as having "cultural" dimensions, even justified
by the Nazi regime as a defensive act to preserve the purity of Aryan
culture.54 Clearly, the potency of "culture" as a claimed exception to "core"
human rights norms cannot be swept under the rug by appeals to rhetoric
that "torture is not part of one's cultural heritage." The "right to culture" is
still actively invoked as a legal exception against observance and full
enforcement of core non-derogable human rights norms.
It is for this reason that the ideological imprecision of the "right to
culture" militates against its value as a normative standard asserted against
the "core" human rights norms from which states (both by customary and
conventional international law) cannot derogate. These non-derogable jus
cogens prohibitions against genocide, torture, slavery, crimes against
humanity, war crimes, and egregious violations of human rights (generally
giving rise to obligations erga omnes) form part of general international
law55 and should not be easily circumvented under a highly malleable and
ambiguous standard such as "culture." To do otherwise would sanction
violence to the highest tier of importance and protection accorded to these
norms, as described in the famous dictum from the Barcelona Traction case:
"[A]n essential distinction should be drawn between the
obligations of a State towards the international community as a
whole, and those arising vis-d-vis another State... By their very
nature, the former are the concern of all States. In view of the
importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have
a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga
omnes. Such obligations derive, for example, in contemporary
international law, from the outlawing of acts of aggression, and
of genocide, as also from the principles and rules concerning the
basic rights of the human person, including protection from
slavery and racial discrimination." 56 (Emphasis supplied)
53 Rebecca Adams, Violence Against Women and International Law: The Fundamental
Right to State Protection from Domestic Violence, New York International Law
Review 20 (2007) 57-130, 78-79.
54 David Nersessian, Rethinking Cultural Genocide under International Law, Human
Rights Dialogue, 2 (2005) 12, can be found at: http://www.cceia.org/resources/
publications/dialogue/2_ 12/section 1/5139.html (last visited 09 January 2009).
55 Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts (eds), Oppenheim's International Law (1992), 978-
1030; Antonio Cassese, International Law, 2 nd ed. (2005), 198-212.56 Barcelona Traction Case, I.C.J. Reports (1970) 3, para. 33.
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For the overriding reason that core human rights norms are non-
derogable and binding on all states as "norms accepted and recognized by
the international community of states as a whole," and "which can be
modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the
same character, ' ,57 the "right to culture" (with its inherent ideological
imprecision) cannot be the basis for an exception. The "right to culture" has
not been shown to be a norm of general international law "having the same
character" as "core" human rights norms.58 The "right to culture," cannot
operate as a normative "exception" as would modify the obligatory
character of "core" and non-derogable human rights norms.
II. Teleological Incoherence
Upholding the "right to culture" as an exception to core non-derogable
human rights norms would also thwart the purpose and design underlying
both sets of rights.
International human rights law, as it developed after the Second
World War, drew currency from theoretical conceptions of the "good" for
an individual, and by extension, the social order, as well as concepts of
"right conduct" and justice. 59 The protection of "human rights" is inimitably
tied up with these theoretical conceptions of the "good." What is the
common theoretical conception of the "good" envisioned as the object of
protection from state incursion and/or third party interference in the case of
both "core" non-derogable human rights norms and the "right to culture?"
57 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 53.
58 Admittedly, this assessment falls prey to the critique of normative relativity, cautioned
against for its weakening of international law as a "normative order" and as a "factor
of social organization"; see Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in
International Law? in: Martii Koskenniemi, Sources of International Law: Library of
Essays in International Law (2000). However, it may also be considered that this
evaluation of the normative quality of non-derogable international legal norms as
opposed to "ordinary" norms simply exemplifies rules for state recognition (not
equivalent to persuasion) of the argument; see David Kennedy, Theses About
International Law Discourse, also in: Koskenniemi, 81-119.
59 For the historical development of international human rights law, see Hersch
Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights (1968), 3-72; see also Patrick Lee,
Soul, Body and Personhood, American Journal of Jurisprudence 49 (2004), 87-125,
116-125; Immanuel Kant, Foundations of Metaphysics of Morals (1959), 49-54,
reproduced in: Henkin, 38-41 (supra note 7); Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the
Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789), Chapter 1, reproduced in: Henkin, 52-54
(supra note 7).
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It is submitted that it is the protection of the individual's
"personhood" that predicates an individual's conception of the "good life. 6 °
While itself a "term of legal art," an individual's "personhood" is
inextricably comprised of aspects such as bodily integrity, autonomy, the
capacity to assert rationality, judgment 61 and the inherent dignity of the
human person. 62 Thus, the core non-derogable human rights norms (jus
cogens prohibitions against torture, slavery, genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes, and egregious violations of civil and political rights
codified in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or
ICCPR) are in themselves articulations of value for aspects of personhood
such as bodily integrity, autonomy, the capacity to assert rationality and
judgment and the inherent dignity of the human person. On the other hand,
the right to culture as a human rights norm is also vital to an individual's
"personhood," as it critically relates to the individual's development of
identity, personality, and beliefs in a wider sphere of group association and
interaction.
63
Since both culture and the core non-derogable human rights norms
appear to be reflections of the same fundamental value of "personhood,"
why then would the assertion of one norm be inimical to the other?
Otherwise stated, why would the international legal order privilege these
core human rights as "non-derogable," (being of supreme importance as
would amount to the level of an obligation erga omnes or an obligation
owed to all States) over the right to culture?
It is submitted that the privileging of core non-derogable human rights
norms draws from the immediacy, inextricability, and/or proximity of these
norms to the individual's human dignity and "personhood. ' ,64 Torture,
genocide, slavery and various forms of crimes against humanity and war
60 For the comprehensive discussion of the totality of "personhood" under the
international legal order, see Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of
the Rights of Individuals Rather than States, American University Law Review
32 (1982) 1, 1-64.
61 See Harvard Law Review Association, What We Talk About When We Talk About
Persons: The Language of a Legal Fiction (Note), Harvard Law Review 114 (2001) 6,
1745-1768, 1759-1768.
62 Oscar Schachter, Human Dignity as a Normative Concept, American Journal of
International Law, 77 (1983) 4, 848-854, 854.
63 Steiner & Alston, 372-381 (supra note 42).
64 Id, It has also been argued that jus cogens or non-derogable peremptory norms
emerged from inspirational analogies from national legal systems' own normative
hierarchies. Theodor Meron, On a Hierarchy of International Human Rights,
American Journal of International Law, 80 (1986) 1, 1-21, 3, 13-21.
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crimes directly threaten the individual's bodily integrity and subordinate his
inherent dignity as a human person. Similarly, the basic civil and political
rights of freedom of thought, religion, association, opinion, speech, and
guarantees of substantive and procedural due process are critical to
preserving the individual's autonomy and independent assertion of
rationality and judgment. 65 The deprivation of these key aspects of
"personhood," through the violation of the "core" non-derogable human
rights norms, trenches upon the legal interest of all States precisely because
this wholly subverts the human conception of the "good" - or the protection
and development of the individual's "personhood."
The individual's right to culture, on the other hand, does not
approximate the same degree of immediacy to the individual's
"personhood" as that manifest from the core non-derogable human rights
norms. The observance of core non-derogable human rights norms enables
the individual's multidirectional access to culture, but the converse situation
does not necessarily hold true. "Cultural" participation, devoid of guarantees
of autonomy, bodily integrity, and rational judgment, would degenerate into
meaningless and enforced interactions to "induce" identity, "design"
personality, and "condition" belief. An individual who enjoys freedom of
thought and expression, for example, can verily interact with others and
thereby shape the environment in which culture materializes and develops.
On the other hand, if that individual's basic autonomy and capacity for
rational judgment is capsulated by the arbitrariness of state interference
expressed through use of force, the individual's overall ability to develop
his "personhood" is compromised under an imposed fiction of "cultural"
participation. "Core" human rights norms, therefore, are intrinsic to the
individual's capacity to avail of his right to culture, but it is not always so
the other way around.
65 See Khaled Abou El Fadl, The Unique and International and the Imperative of
Discourse, Chicago Journal of International Law 8 (2007), 43-58, 43-44; Rosalyn
Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It (1995), 96.
"[...] I believe profoundly in the universality of the human spirit. Individuals
everywhere want the same essential things: to have sufficient food and shelter, to be
able to speak freely; to practice their own religion or to abstain from religious belief,
to feel that their person is not threatened by the state; to know that they will not be
tortured, or detained without charge, and that, if charged, they will have a fair trial. I
believe there is nothing in these aspirations that is dependent upon culture, or religion,
or stage of development. They are as keenly felt by the African tribesman as by the
European city-dweller, by the inhabitant of a Latin American shanty-town as by the
resident of a Manhattan apartment."
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The right to "culture" therefore cannot be validly asserted as a
normative exception to "core" non-derogable human rights norms. To do so
courts teleological incoherence, and needlessly risks the purpose and design
of the theoretical conception of the "good" (individual "personhood") as
expressed in these norms. The subordination of "culture" claims to "core"
human rights norms is recognized in the provisions of the UNESCO
Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity:
"Article 4. No one may invoke cultural diversity to infringe
upon human rights guaranteed by international law, nor to limit
their scope.
Article 5. Cultural rights are an integral part of human rights,
which are universal, indivisible, and interdependent...and all
persons have the right to participate in the cultural life of their
choice and conduct their own cultural practices, subject to
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms."
66
Apart from the use of interdisciplinary approaches, therefore, it is
submitted that the viability of the "right to culture" as a normative exception
should also be weighed against the ideological and teleological basis of the
"core" non-derogable human rights norms. Rather than fall into the trap of
pitting cultural anthropological and scientific claims (universalist or
particularist), focus should be redirected towards the binding scope and
obligatory nature of these "core" human rights norms as part of general
international law. Since the "right to culture" suffers from the vice of
ideological imprecision and teleological incoherence, it can be more
plausibly argued that "culture" cannot operate as an exception given the
peremptory status of these "core" human rights norms.
66 UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, Articles 2, 4, and 5; See also
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Article 15(1);
Universal Declaration on Human Rights; Principle 13 of the 1994 Draft Principles of
Human Rights.
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D. Empirical and Causal Weaknesses of the "Right to
Development" as an Exception to "Universalizing"
Core Human Rights Norms
North-South discourse featured the "right to development' 67 as
another exception to the universality of human rights. The argument
contextualizes Western insistence on universality against the
postcolonialism of international law as a whole,68 and stresses that the call
for full enforcement and universality of human rights is yet another mode of
Western imperialism to arrest the development of Southern states,
particularly on the platforms of democracy and rule of law.69 The
"development" exception is also justified as a "fundamental right," the
"precondition of liberty, progress, justice and creativity," the "alpha and
omega of rights," flowing and carrying the same importance as the right to
self-determination.7 0 Critical responses to the "development" exception,
therefore, tended to focus on the abstract and expansive content of the right;
the dearth of international recognition for this right; and its precarious (even
nonexistent) conventional and customary foundations under international
law.
7 1
ASEAN's forty-year record marks strong recognition, codification,
and enforcement of economic and social rights as extensions flowing from
the right to development. The tradeoff between "universalizing" core human
rights norms (or explicit recognition, codification, and enforcement of such
first-generation civil and political rights and corresponding jus cogens
prohibitions) has been justified under the rubric of state sovereignty and
67 See Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23. Full
text at: http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/vienna.htm (last visited 23 August 2007).
68 See Sundhya Pahuja, The Postcoloniality of International Law, Harvard International
Law Journal, 46 (2005), 459-469, 467-468; which seeks the reestablishment of
human rights that are wary of universality because "it is necessary to explore the
relationship between the concept of universality itself and the byzantine
reinforcements of colonial power and knowledge, not to mention its relationship to
Christianity." The author stresses that the search for foundations of the normative
content of universality is itself a "search for authority", the narrative of which has the
effect of being "authoritative and authorizing".
69 Randall Peerenboom, Human Rights and Rule of Law: What's the Relationship?,
Georgetown Journal of International Law, 36 (2005), 809-854, 817-818.
70 Steiner & Alston, 1321-1322 (supra note 42).
71 Jack Donnelly, In Search of the Unicorn: The Jurisprudence and Politics of the Right
to Development, California Western International Law Journal, 15 (1985), 473-509,
482-509.
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non-interference with the developmental policies of ASEAN Member
States. Some ASEAN Member States still retain national or internal security
legislation (the validity of which is challenged under core human rights
norms) in their statute books, notwithstanding their disuse in the past
decades.72
Similar to the previous section's analysis of the "right to culture"
exception, the value of the "right to development" as a normative standard
must be weighed against the binding scope and obligatory nature of "core"
non-derogable human rights norms. However, apart from the oft-cited
responses of a lack of conceptual clarity and legal support for the "right to
development" as a competing, "equal" right to the "core" non-derogable
human rights norms, it is further submitted that the additional weaknesses of
the "right to development" lie in its empirical uncertainty and causal
nebulousness.
I. Empirical Uncertainty
The logic of the "development" exception has a Maslow-like appeal.73
"Development" responds to the individual's most basic needs, whereas
"core" non-derogable human rights norms appear more remote from the
individual's physical viability as a human being. "Core" non-derogable
human rights norms are frequently couched in "negative" terms or
prohibitions, in contrast to "development" which connotes "affirmative"
rights (second-generation economic and social rights, and third-generation
collective or welfare rights). For empiricists, the tangibility of
"development" should prove infinitely more satisfactory as a value to be
protected by the international legal order, rather than the intangibility of
constructs such as the right to life, freedom of association and opinion,
speech, thought, religion, among others.
This very same initial appeal, however, ultimately undercuts the utility
of "development" as a value that should have precedence in international
legal protection. What degree or extent of development is "sufficient"
before civil and political rights can be recognized and enforced? If it is
asserted that states are the sole arbiters of their developmental models and
policies, then necessarily, states therefore possess the sole discretion on the
recognition and enforcement of "core" human rights norms. This line of
72 Such as the respective Internal Security Acts of Malaysia and Singapore.
73 Maslow's hierarchy of needs theory is set out in his 1943 paper entitled "A Theory of
Human Motivation". Summary at: https://www.ahpweb.org/articles/theory human
_motivation.html (last visited 23 January 2009).
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reasoning is in complete accord with the proposition that international law
bears legitimacy only because states act (and sanction conduct) in pursuit of
their self-interest.74 However, while it has been observed that "states in the
ordinary yet important run of their affairs generally observe international
law,",75 compliance as the "only" test for validity of international law has
long been outmoded. Norms of international law arise from their breach as
much as from their observance.76 "Soft law" has also emerged and is also a
subject of international compliance, under their fundamental importance as
generating "expectations about the future behavior and attitudes of
international actors, providing a measure of stability within the evolving
system while still maintaining some flexibility. " 77 The legitimacy of
international law (particularly international human rights law) cannot thus
be reduced to the measure of subjective and arbitrary state implementation.
Further compounding the indeterminacy of the right to "development"
is the proliferation of diverse economic development models and growth
theories. From the broad spectrum of neo-Keynesian state interventionism
and neoclassical laissez-faire economics, economists themselves dispute the
determinants of growth, and the extent of state incursion, corporatism,
and/or necessary interference with the individual's basic civil and political
freedoms in order to bolster growth rates and reduce income inequalities.
The disparity in the models for public governance, state authority, and
individual freedoms was further highlighted in the literature explaining the
implosion of many Asian economies during the 1997 Asian financial crisis.
Among relatively recent development theories is the categorization of
the individual's basic civil and political rights as an endogenous
determinant of development. In "Development as Freedom,, 78 Nobel Prize-
winning economist Amartya Sen conceptualizes "development" as
"capabilities," or substantive human freedoms. Civil and political freedoms
are deemed constitutive of development, since a liberal democracy is both a
means and an end in itself. Civil and political rights are pivotal to
"conceptualizing" economic needs, enabling individuals to have
constructive inputs in shaping values and norms. From this perspective, the
supposed "tradeoff' between development and "core" non-derogable human
rights norms is at best, illusory.
74 Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, The Limits of International Law (2005), 23-26.
75 Stephen M. Schwebel, Justice in International Law (1994), 598-607.
76 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, I.C.J. Reports (1969), 1-260.
77 Dinah Shelton (ed.), Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms
in the International Legal System (2000), 23.
78 Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (2000), 54-86.
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Regardless of the growth and development theory subscribed to by a
state, there is weak rational value in the "right to development" as a
normative exception to "core" non-derogable human rights norms. As
discussed in Part II, the telos of "core" non-derogable human rights norms is
the defence of the individual's "personhood." It is due to states' general
agreement in the conception of this "good" that these norms have attained
the status ofjus cogens (and where the correspondence applies, obligations
erga omnes). The empirical uncertainty of "development" substantiates the
threat of statist arbitrariness and coercion upon the conception of the
"good," or the individual's "personhood." If Sen's definition of
"development" holds, then "core" human rights norms should not be seen as
an obstacle, but as necessary instruments to advance states' conception of
the "good," or the individual's "personhood."
II. Causal Nebulousness
An argument privileging "development" to the exclusion of "core"
human rights norms implies that the recognition and enforcement of these
norms impedes development. This is not an easy causality to draw or prove.
Citing the scarcity (and conflicting results) of quantitative and qualitative
studies on the negative proportionality between recognition and
enforcement of human rights norms and economic development, scholars
advocate "rule of law" as a substitute analytical foCUS. 7 9 It is difficult to
assign variables for empirically measuring already indeterminate concepts
such as "development," "degree of recognition of "core" human rights
norms," and "level of enforcement" of such norms, without falling prey to
the criticism of partiality.
8 0
The nebulousness does not end there. More critically, recent literature
considers a reverse causal relationship between development and human
rights enforcement. Instead of human rights enforcement impeding
economic development, the proposition advanced is that the violation of
human rights is a causal determinant of poverty.8s "Core" human rights
norms are deemed to form part of human capital,82 and are thus
79 Charter of the United Nations, Chapter 1, Article 1(3) (supra note 11).
80 See Sally Engle Merry, Anthropology and Activism: Researching Human Rights
Across Porous Boundaries, Political & Legal Anthropology Review, 28 (2005) 2, 240-
258, 245-246.
81 Aifredo Sfeir-Younis, The Violation of Human Rights as a Determinant of Poverty,
International Social Science Journal, 56 (2004) 180, 321-325.
82 See Elhanan Helpman, The Mystery of Economic Growth (2004), 111-142.
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inextricably linked to the processes of wealth creation, poverty alleviation,
and developmental effectiveness:
"[... ]those whose human rights are violated, or have no
possibilities to realize them (i.e. whose human rights are
denied even if not deliberately violated), are severely
handicapped in the whole process of capital accumulation.
Absence of respect for human rights means social exclusion,
loss of individual and social identity, and marginalization. This,
in turn, means little or no access to productive assets. Lack of
capital both constitutes poverty and entrenches it. Available
capital, conversely, is a crucial means of getting out of poverty.
I... I
In recent decades, much focus has been placed on poor people
and their ability to accumulate capital - physical (e.g.
infrastructure), financial (e.g. credit), and human (e.g.
education). Much less attention has been paid to how the poor
accumulate other forms of capital, in particular natural,
institutional, and cultural capita. The focus here is on
institutional capital, which includes a number of components
(e.g. organizational arrangements, the role of different actors,
incentive structures and instruments, participation,
empowerment, governance), and the objective is to emphasize
the importance of the normative and rule-making aspects of
development. The key claim is indeed that rule-making must
become an intervening and endogenous variable in the design
and implementation of poverty alleviation programs rather than
a residual to the manipulation of other forms of capital.
[... I
Human rights are a form of capital endowment that the poor
need to accumulate, within the context of all the forms of capital
listed above, in order to escape poverty. This perspective offers
a common framework to assess how violations of human rights
- which limit directly the ability of poor people to accumulate
"human rights capital" as well as indirectly limiting their access
to other forms of capital - become a major determinant of
entrenched poverty."
Thus, if the causality between enforcement of "core" human rights
norms and development is nebulous at best, and even supportive of abuse at
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worst, there is no value in privileging the "right to development," exception
as a normative standard asserted against core non-derogable human rights
norms.
As has been shown, there are additional objections (based on
empirical uncertainty and causal nebulousness) to permitting the use of the
"right to development" as an exception to core human rights norms. The
universality of these core human rights norms is based on states' theoretical
conception of the "good" - which is the promotion and protection of the
individual's "personhood." "Development," while itself a value, requires
greater precision and proximity to the individual's "personhood" than the
core non-derogable human rights norms.
E. The "Push and Pull" Effect of ASEAN's "Internal"
and "External" Spheres, and the "Equilibrium"-
Imperative of Universalism of Core Human Rights
Norms
Given the inherent weaknesses of the "culture" and "development"
exceptions as normative standards against "core" human rights norms, there
is no reason why the "new" ASEAN and its Member States under the
ASEAN Charter should relapse into these timeworn justifications. More so,
developments within and outside of ASEAN in its forty year history reflect
an "internal" push and "external" pull towards universalizing these "core"
human rights norms through recognition, codification, and enforcement in
the Southeast Asian region.
I. The "Internal-Push"
ASEAN's "internal" sphere, forty years from its inception,
demonstrates that the opinio juris of its Member States is towards
recognition and observance of these "core" human rights norms. The
majority, if not all of its Member States, have, in recent years, either signed,
ratified, or acceded to the fundamental treaties and conventions codifying
the "core" human rights norms on civil and political rights and the jus
cogens prohibitions against torture, crimes against humanity, slavery,
genocide, racial discrimination, and other egregious human rights
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violations. 83 Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and the Philippines, have already
ratified the Apartheid Convention. All ASEAN Member States have ratified
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).
Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam have all
ratified the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
(CERD). Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore,
and Vietnam have likewise ratified the Genocide Convention. The ICCPR
has been ratified by Indonesia, Laos, the Philippines, Thailand, and
Vietnam. In the last decade, the Torture Convention has been ratified by
Indonesia, and the Philippines. Alongside these developments, it may be
noted that ASEAN's most significant regional dialogue partners, China and
India, have likewise ratified these international instruments. Clearly, even
states most vocal about relying on the "culture" and "development"
justifications, such as China and India, have by and large, evinced similar
recognition of these "core" human rights norms. These acts of state
recognition lend force to the obligatory character of these norms.
Notably, all ASEAN Member States are also parties to the UN
Charter, which mandates human rights protection and promotion as one of
its fundamental purposes. Consistent with ASEAN Member States'
obligations under the UN Charter, ASEAN's own declarations and
communiques 84 among Member States likewise manifest the growing opinio
juris in favour of "universalizing" "core" human rights norms through
recognition and enforcement. Thus, both from the individual perspectives of
Member States and the institutional perspective of ASEAN, the record of
the last forty years shows a convergence towards recognition and
enforcement of "core" human rights norms. The formal inclusion of the
83 See http://www.unhcr.org (last visited 18 August 2008) for the status of ASEAN
Member States' signatures, ratifications and accessions to the "core" human rights
treaties on civil and political rights.
84 Joint Communique of the 2 6th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Singapore, 23-
24 July 1993; Joint Communique of the 31st ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Manila, 24-
25 July 1998; Joint Communique of the 32 nd ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Singapore,
23-24 July 1999; Joint Communique of the 33d ASEAN Ministerial Meeting,
Bangkok, 24-25 July 2000; Joint Communique of the 3 4 th ASEAN Ministerial
Meeting, Hanoi, 23-24 July 2001; Joint Communique of the 35th ASEAN Ministerial
Meeting, Bandar Seri Begawan, 29-30 July 2002; Joint Communique of the 36th
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Phnom Penh, 16-17 June 2003; Joint Communique of
the 3 7 th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Jakarta, 29 June - 2 July 2004; Hanoi Plan of
Action; ASEAN Vision 2020; ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational
Crime.
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recognition and protection of these norms in the language of the ASEAN
Charter crystallizes the "internal push" towards universalizing these norms
in the Southeast Asian region.
II. The "External Pull"
At the same time, ASEAN's forty-year history cannot be read in
isolation from developments in the international sphere. New customary
norms of international law have also emerged through the development of
more international enforcement mechanisms for human rights protection
from ad hoc offices, international organizations, fact-finding, and other
permutations of negotiated mediation, 85 to the stricter form of prosecutions
in the various international criminal tribunals (seen in the jurisprudence of
Nuremburg and the International Military Tribunals, the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda, and now the International Criminal Court), violations
of "core" human rights norms on civil and political rights and thejus cogens
prohibitions on torture, crimes against humanity, war crimes, genocide,
slavery, racial discrimination, and other egregious violations of international
human rights and humanitarian law. There is considerable support for the
view that states have the international legal obligation to reject impunity for
egregious violations of "core" human rights norms, as stated, for example,
in UN Security Council Resolution 1674, which "reaffirms that ending
impunity is essential if a society in conflict or recovering from conflict is to
come to terms with past abuses committed against civilians affected by
armed conflict and to prevent future such abuses..." and "emphasizes in this
context the responsibility of States to comply with their relevant obligations
to end impunity and to prosecute those responsible for war crimes,
genocide, crimes against humanity and serious violations of international
humanitarian law..." as well as "calls on States.. .to take appropriate
legislative, judicial and administrative measures to implement their
obligations under instruments [of international humanitarian, human rights
and refugee law] .86
The customary rejection of impunity finds expression in various state
duties. These include, among others: 1) the duty to prosecute persons
85 Dinah Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law (2000), 137-182.
86 UN Security Council Resolution 1674 (2006), S/RES/1674 (2006); 2005 World
Summit Outcome, 24 October 2005, paras. 119-126 at: http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/
UNDOC/GEN/N05/487/60/PDF/N0548760.pdf?OpenElement (last visited
26 September 2008).
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committing serious international crimes and crimes against humanity; 87 2)
the duty to ensure that there is no "denial of justice" to persons residing or
sojourning in state territory, due to "bad faith, the wilful neglect of duty, or
an insufficiency of governmental action so far short of international
standards that every reasonable and impartial man would readily recognize
its insufficiency"; 88 and 3) the duty to protect the fundamental human right
of all persons to an effective remedy. 89
The customary norm rejecting impunity should therefore be read into
the legal parameters of state conduct for ASEAN and its Member States.
This is the "external pull" that now draws ASEAN and its Member States
towards universalizing core human rights norms through the recognition and
enforcement of these norms in the Southeast Asian region.
Considering the "internal push" and the "external pull" effects of
spheres affecting ASEAN and its Member States, therefore, the explicit
inclusion in the ASEAN Charter of human rights protection as among the
fundamental purposes of ASEAN (and forty years after the "neutral"
language of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and the Bangkok
Declaration) expresses the convergence towards the "equilibrium-
imperative" of universalizing "core" human rights norms. This is in itself a
laudable departure from ASEAN's silence in the last forty years, and
reflects a political-ideological maturity and the mobilizing potential of
ASEAN's role as an international organization.
The inevitable convergence of ASEAN towards "universalizing" core
human rights norms through their recognition, codification, and
enforcement should not be inhibited by back-pedalling towards "cultural"
and "developmental" exceptionalism. As previously shown, appeals to the
"right to culture" and the "right to development" should be made cautiously
(if at all), in view of their inherent weaknesses as normative standards.
87 Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights
Violations of a Prior Regime, Yale Law Journal 100 (1991) 8, 2537-2615, 2593-2594.
88 Jan Paulsson, Denial of Justice in International Law (2006), 68-69.
89 Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; Article 2(3) of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; Article 6 of the Convention on
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination; Article 2(c) of the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women; Article 14 of the
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment;
Article 16 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child; Article 11(3) of the American
Convention on Human Rights; Article 8 of the European Convention on Human
Rights; Article 5 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights; Articles 16(4)
and 16(5) of the Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in
Independent Countries, ILO No. 69, 27 June 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1382.
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Taken against the emergence of customary international law rejecting
impunity, the "right to culture" and the "right to development" should be
subject to strict judicial scrutiny standards (even an outright presumption
against validity) before they are asserted to justify state derogations from
"core" human rights norms.90
The "new" status of ASEAN as an international organization thus
raises various questions on its separate responsibility as an international
organization and the derivative responsibilities of its Member States.
Considering that the ASEAN Charter mandates human rights protection and
observance as one of ASEAN's fundamental organizational purposes and
vests the ASEAN Summit with the authority to make binding decisions on
its members, it is submitted that ASEAN as a distinct international
organization should bear the duty of observing core human rights norms and
ensuring compliance by its Member States. While the new ASEAN does not
assume the full form and structural complex of the European Union,
ASEAN can nonetheless retain an analogous "margin of appreciation" in the
recognition and enforcement of these norms within the framework of the
new ASEAN Charter. Under the doctrine of margin of appreciation in the
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, there is a realistic
"judicial "self-restraint" in recognition of the obligation to respect, "within
certain bounds, the cultural and ideological variety, and also the legal
variety characteristic of Europe." 91 ASEAN's enduring principle of mutual
respect for diversity among its Member States could be preserved,
notwithstanding ASEAN's new international obligations of rejecting
impunity through ensuring recognition and enforcement of "core" human
rights norms. The test for the governing institutions of ASEAN
(specifically, the highest level of governance under the ASEAN Summit) is
how and in what manner it will undertake this balancing test within the
90 Which is not to say that the competing rights to culture and development should not
figure in the discourse on human rights protection and observance by Southeast Asian
governments. What I have tried to show, however, is that the traditional supremacist
justifications for reliance on these rights are now timeworn in view of the strong
international rejection of impunity for serious human rights violations. Conceivably,
Southeast Asian states' own practices, declarations, and express international
obligations over the last forty years have themselves contributed to the development
of the norm rejecting impunity. If militant or repressive Southeast Asian governments
would seek exception from the observance of core international human rights norms
under the new ASEAN Charter, they are now impelled by their ASEAN membership
obligations to provide more rigorous theoretical and analytical foundations to justify
non-compliance.
91 Steiner & Alston, 854-856, (supra note 42).
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framework of institutional competences and membership obligations under
the ASEAN Charter.
F. Conclusion
While ever mindful of diversity, ASEAN's new status and
organizational purpose is ultimately, a choice to transcend the limitations of
"culture" and "development" exceptionalism in favour of affirming states'
theoretical conception of the "good" - the protection and enhancement of
individual "personhood." It is a choice over forty years in the making, and is
highly significant due to the region's deliberate move from loose and
informal ties under developmental cooperation towards a more binding
formal structure oriented towards international legal compliance.
In a region densely marked with diversity and resistance to express
codification of civil and political rights, it is a significant development that
the ASEAN Member States committed themselves to "promote and protect
human rights and fundamental freedoms," "uphold the United Nations
Charter and international law, including humanitarian law," and adhere "to
the rule of law, good governance, the principles of democracy and
constitutional government." 92 These undertakings are not mere hortatory
platitudes, but indeed constitute binding international obligations upon
ASEAN Member States. 93 Even more telling is the fact that a region with
Member States emerging from (or still under) authoritarian or militaristic
regimes has purposely expanded Member States' international obligations
by expressly committing to "take all necessary measures, including the
enactment of appropriate domestic legislation, to effectively implement the
provisions of this Charter and to comply with all obligations of
92 ASEAN Charter, Articles 1(7) and 2(i),(j), and (h).
93 These norms satisfy the five necessary and sufficient conditions for the process-driven
establishment of obligatory norms: 1) formulation and designation of a requirement as
to behaviour in contingent circumstances; 2) an indication that that designation has
been made by persons recognized as having the competence (authority/legitimate role)
to perform that function and in accordance with procedures accepted as proper for that
purpose; 3) an indication of the capacity and willingness of those concerned to make
the designated requirement effective in fact; 4) the transmittal of the requirement to
those to whom it is addressed (the target audience); and 5) the creation in the target
audience of responses (both psychological and operational) which indicate that the
designated requirement is regarded as authoritative and as likely to be complied with
in the future to some substantial degree. See: Oscar Schachter, Towards a Theory of
International Obligation", in Koskenniemi, 9-31 (supra note 59).
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membership." 94 The ASEAN Charter marks a decidedly universalist
topography visible from Southeast Asia's widened political space for public
international discourse. Given ASEAN Member States' near half-century
experience in consensus based decision making, their willingness to modify
this mode of decision making (by permitting the ASEAN Summit to "decide
on how a decision should be made" in the event of failure to reach a
consensus) is reason enough for some optimism on the possibility of
approximating procedural (through a rational consensus), as well as
contextual universalism.
95
It would also appear that ASEAN's evolution from cooperation to
integration augurs well for the realization of a genuine Habermasian rational
consensus on democratic commitments. Notably, ASEAN's forty year
history of (informal) developmental cooperation itself paved the way for the
arduous process of diplomatic and informal negotiations among ASEAN
Member States (fuelled by initiatives among counterpart domestic
representatives, interest groups and organizations within ASEAN Member
States) - which led to the ASEAN Member States' collective decision to
abide by, and participate in, democratic international lawmaking under the
ASEAN Charter. 96 The widespread involvement of diplomats, scholars,
lawyers, bureaucrats, interest groups and community organizations in the
creation of the integrated ASEAN is itself a triumph for liberal
internationalism in the region.
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Certainly, however, optimism toward structural progress must be
tempered with realistic concerns. Among various regional polities
throughout the world, it cannot be said that Southeast Asia is the model of
international human rights observance and compliance." Critics have
94 ASEAN Charter, Chapter III, Article 5(2).
95 See Alessandro Ferrara, Universalisms: Procedural, Contextualist, and Prudential, in:
David Rasmussen (ed.). Universalism v. Communitarianism: Contempory Debates in
Ethics (1995), 11-38.
96 Considering the relative history of other international organizations, ASEAN's
emergence as a formally integrated regional organization after forty years speaks
volumes about a shared history of "bureaucratic sclerosis" with other international
organizations; Jose E. Alvarez, International Organizations: Then and Now, American
Journal of International Law 100 (2006) 2, 324-347, 346.97 See Anne Marie Slaughter, A Liberal Theory of International Law, American Society
of International Law Proceedings 94 (2000) 240-248, 242-246.
98 For a synthesized report on Southeast Asian human rights developments, including,
among others, extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances in the Philippines,
infringement of suffrage and electoral rights in Malaysia and Cambodia, suppression
of press freedoms and the right to expression in Myanmar, see
http://www.hrw.org/doc?t-southeast-asia (last visited 31 August 2008).
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assailed the ASEAN Charter for failing to concretely provide for a human
rights tribunals or bodies. The ASEAN Charter only provides for an
executory provision where, "[iln conformity with the purposes and
principles of the ASEAN Charter relating to the promotion and protection of
human rights and fundamental freedoms, ASEAN shall establish an ASEAN
human rights body," leaving the terms of reference for such a body to be
determined in a forthcoming ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting to be
convened after the entry into force of the ASEAN Charter.99 There is much
left to be done, articulated and resolved, in light of the shared and unique
experience of religio-political heterogeneity in Southeast Asia.
At the very least, for the ASEAN region and its constituents, the scholarly
debate has finally moved on from the parochialism of "Asian values versus
Western imperialism." A newly integrated, officially institutionalized, and
rules based ASEAN, with the specific international obligations assumed by
its Member States, consciously evinces a universalist design in its Charter
framework. Given the internal and external spheres of ASEAN polities, we
can hardly expect otherwise. The new ASEAN Charter should be viewed as
the tangible culmination of its individual Member States' practice and
opiniojuris on universal norms, a move to political-economic integration
that demonstrates universalist consciousness of human dignity, and a
growing openness to the architecture of global citizenship 100 in international
human rights law.
99 ASEAN Charter, Chapter IV (Organs), Articles 14(1) and 14(2).
100 See for an analysis of the international development of common legal principles
Sabino Cassesse, The Globalization of Law, New York University Journal of
International Law and Politics 37 (2005) 4, 973-993.
